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A THING IS WHAT WE SAY IT IS: 
 
REFERENTIAL COMMUNICATION AND INDIRECT CATEGORY LEARNING 
 




This study investigates the interaction of referential communication and the 
structure of perceptual features on the joint processes of inventing a referential lexicon 
for novel objects and discovering the functional significance of those objects during an 
indirect category learning activity. During the learning task, participants worked either 
individually or as cooperative dyads to learn four combinations of orthogonal functional 
features—nutritive vs. not nutritive and destructive vs. not destructive—that defined four 
categories of fictional extra-terrestrial creatures. These categories were not specifically 
identified or labeled; rather, participants had to infer them indirectly as they predicted the 
functions. Also, these functionally defined categories exhibited a complex perceptual 
structure: a unidimensional (simple) rule predicted one function, while a family 
resemblance (complex) sub-structure predicted the other function. The function-learning 
task yielded function prediction data.  In addition, each learner worked individually to 
sort the creatures (pre- and post-function learning) and to predict their functions in an 
individual function prediction posttest that also yielded selective attention data. 
Together, the prediction data, sort data, and selective attention data supported 
three a priori hypotheses.  Referential communication generates conceptual homogeneity 
(H3) and enhances indirect category learning (H1), though simple rules are learned 
earlier and better than complex relationships (H2). In explaining the learning advantages 
  
observed among dyadic learners, I argue that referential communication may highlight 
attention to relationships between features (perceptual and functional) and actions as well 
as render such relationships more memorable. Moreover, communication may foster 
greater motivation among collaborators and may allow them to take advantage of the 
differing expectations and heuristics each collaborator brings to the task. In explaining 
the simplicity advantages observed among dyadic learners, I argue that referential 
communication may provide explicit “rules” for otherwise implicit (and perhaps more 
difficult) judgements. Dyads appear to have established reference to simple rules earlier 
than they established reference to complex rules; thus, they could explicitly (and perhaps 
more easily) learn the simple rule earlier than the complex rule. Finally, in explaining the 
conceptual homogeneity between and within dyads, I consider whether communication 
pushes “public” conceptualizations and publicly-formed “private” conceptualizations 
towards a limited range of widely shareable conceptual structures.
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Background 
Joint Activity & Referential Communication 
Human beings engage in myriad joint activities: a parent and child jointly build a 
Lego robot; two families jointly plan and execute a wedding celebration; a far-flung 
group of scholars and researchers jointly develop a domain of knowledge. The successful 
performance of these and other joint activities requires the coordination of actions 
(Schelling, 1960); the coordination of actions presupposes the coordination of intentions, 
assumptions, and beliefs that drive those actions (Lewis, 1969; Stalnaker, 1978, 2002; 
Clark, 1996). Referential communication can facilitate these multiple levels of 
coordination (cf., Bangerter & Clark, 2003; Sacks, Schegloff, & Jefferson, 1974). 
An Example of Coordination Through Referential Communication 
Imagine the following exchange between Alpha and Beta (named for their status 
in the kitchen) as they prepare a meal to impress their new girlfriends, Bonita and Belle 
(named for their beauty). Inspired by a mutton shank, Alpha requests, “heat up the tagine, 
while I dice the aromatics.” At the cookware cabinet, Beta asks, “the heavy one with the 
flat lid?” “No,” clarifies Alpha, “that’s the dutch oven. We need the ceramic one with the 
conical lid.” “Ok;” Beta confirms and asks, “should I put on a kettle for couscous, while 
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I’m at it?” While the conversation between Alpha and Beta could continue in this way 
over multiple pages, this much of the exchange suffices to illustrate how referential 
communication helps them coordinate their culinary seduction of Bonita and Belle. 
“Public” Categorization 
Referential communication serves as a form of externalized or “public” cognition 
(cf., Wittgenstein, 2001 [1958]), including “public” processes of categorization (see 
Russell, 1905; Brown, 1958; Grice, 1975; Cruse, 1977; Barr & Kronmüller, 2006 for 
various formulations of the conceptual function of reference). In the scenario, Alpha 
performs three such “public” categorizations: “aromatics” are a category of vegetables—
onions, carrots, celery, et al.—used to flavor a dish, while “tagine” and “dutch oven” are 
subcategories of braisers—shallow, tightly-lidded pots used for slowly cooking a dish in 
its own condensation. By using a particular reference at a particular level of reference, 
communicating actors direct each other's attention (Kronmüller & Barr, 2007; Metzing 
& Brennan, 2003) to those features that allow each of them to differentiate the target 
referent from other possible referents (E.V. Clark, 1987; Mervis & Crisafi, 1982; Murphy 
& Brownell, 1985). Alpha instructs Beta to “heat up the tagine” (as opposed to “heat up 
the pot” or “heat up the braiser”) in order to help Beta differentiate the target cookware 
from the stock pots, roasting pans, and skillets in the cookware cabinet. Beta understands 
that a tagine is kind of braiser, but needs Alpha to direct his attention to the tagine’s 
differentiating features: ceramic vs. cast iron, conical lid vs. flat lid. Further, the use of a 
particular reference at a particular level of reference can direct joint attention to those 
features that allow each actor to infer the referent's significance to the activity (Brown, 
3 
 
1958; Corter & Gluck, 1992). The tagine originates from Morocco; so, Beta infers from 
that feature that Alpha has proposed that they prepare a Moroccan dish and confirms that 
joint intention by asking if he should boil water for couscous. Beta’s confirmatory 
question completes the “public” categorization of the tagine. The successful use of a 
particular reference at a particular level of reference should elicit an action that confirms 
the joint construal of both the target and its significance to the activity (Austin, 1976; 
Krauss & Weinheimer, 1966; Wilkes-Gibbs & Clark, 1992; Clark & Schaefer, 1989). 
Shareability 
Cooking is a recurring, often institutionalized, coordination problem; therefore 
Alpha and Beta can rely heavily on conventions of referential communication—a 
repertoire of mutually-known, mutually-salient, and mutually-expected associations 
between reference and concept. Adherence to referential conventions can minimize the 
cognitive effort of directing joint attention, confirming joint construal, and executing 
joint intentions (Clark, 1996, Lewis, 1969). In this way, referential conventions convey 
conceptual information in a highly shareable form (cf., Freyd, 1983). Nevertheless, when 
faced with a new or unfamiliar activity, communicating actors often rely on ad hoc 
referential conventions (Garrod & Anderson, 1987; Brennan & Clark, 1996; et al.). 
Imagine Alpha and Beta repairing the electric ignitor on their stove; unfamiliar 
with the conventional names for various circuit parts, Beta points out, “that mini-bulb has 
burned out,” referring to a glass cartridge fuse. Such ad hoc conventions also reduce the 
cognitive effort of directing joint attention (Clark Schreuder, & Buttrick, 1983; Clark, 
1972; Clark & Marshall, 1981), confirming joint construal (Wilkes-Gibbs & Clark, 1992; 
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Isaacs & Clark, 1987; Clark & Krych, 2004), and executing joint intentions (Clark & 
Lucy, 1975; Francik & Clark, 1985). The use of “mini-bulb” directs Alpha’s attention to 
a small glass object, containing a fine metal element. Alpha responds, “yeah, the filament 
has melted,” confirming his joint construal of “mini-bulb.” Moreover, these ad hoc 
conventions may affect how each actor later sorts conventionally named objects 
(Markman & Makin, 1998) and how each actor later judges the similarity and/or 
typicality of objects to a conventionally named category (Malt & Sloman, 2004).  For 
example, one might expect Alpha or Beta to search for glass cartridge fuses in the 
lighting aisle of the hardware store rather than the circuitry aisle. 
Nevertheless, ad hoc referential conventions can vary in shareability. The mini-
bulb category ultimately fails. It does not enable either Alpha or Beta to infer the 
functional significance of the fuse—a device for protecting circuits from the power 
surges that today burned a fuse and tomorrow might burn their building. For Alpha and 
Beta this failure will not persist; the hardware clerk will likely provide the necessary 
knowledge. In an entirely novel activity, communicating actors lack both prior 
knowledge and access to third-party experts. They must invent a referential lexicon for 
the objects, actions, and events in the activity environment as they discover the 
differentiating and significant features of those objects, actions, and events. Under such 
conditions, shareability may vary with more basic factors, such as feature structure. 
Structural Constraints 
When engaged in private categorization—category learning during individual 
activity—human beings tend to learn simple relationships between features and their 
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significance more easily than complex relationships (cf., Feldman, 2003b). Imagine 
Bonita, a bee researcher, trying to diagnose colony collapse. She easily diagnoses parasite 
infestation, based on the presence or absence of mites; diagnosing vanishing bee 
syndrome, with its varying constellation of symptoms and uncertain causes, requires 
more effort and yields tentative results. Then again, simply labeling a privately learned 
category can enhance an individual’s ability to infer the category’s significance to the 
activity despite fairly complex, even contradictory, featural information (Yamauchi & 
Markman, 2000). Even a tentative diagnosis of a “syndrome” should prompt Bonita to 
suspect factors that cause general disruptions in the immune systems of the bees. What 
happens, though, when Bonita invites Belle, a designer of agent-based models, to 
collaborate on a simulation of colony collapse; will their conversation bog down in the 
complexities of vanishing bee syndrome, or will their emerging convention of referential 
labels enhance their joint reasoning? How structural complexity affects the shareability of 
ad hoc conventions remains uncertain. 
Purpose 
With the present study, I investigated the interaction of referential communication 
and the structure of perceptual features on the joint processes of inventing a referential 
lexicon for novel objects and discovering the functional significance of those objects 
during an indirect category learning activity. To that end, participants worked either 
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individually or as cooperative1 dyads to learn four combinations of orthogonal functional 
features—nutritive vs. not nutritive and destructive vs. not destructive—that defined four 
categories of fictional extra-terrestrial creatures. These categories were not specifically 
identified or labeled; rather, participants had to infer them indirectly as they predicted the 
functions. Also, these functionally defined categories exhibited a complex perceptual 
structure: a unidimensional (simple) rule predicted one function, while a family 
resemblance (complex) sub-structure predicted the other function. This function-learning 
task yielded function prediction data.  In addition to the main function-learning task, each 
learner worked individually to sort the creatures (pre- and post-function learning) and to 
predict their functions in an individual function prediction posttest that also yielded 
selective attention data. Together, the prediction data, sort data, and selective attention 
data demonstrated the overall affects of referential communication on the extra-linguistic 
aspects of concept learning and the differing affects of communication on the learning of 
simple versus complex relationships between perceptual and latent features. 
Structure of the Dissertation 
What follows is a detailed report of this investigation, organized into four 
chapters. In the Literature Review chapter, I attempt to integrate findings and constructs 
from two research traditions: cognitive research on category learning, both in general and 
with an explicit focus on lexically labeled categories, and psycho-linguistic research on 
conversation and referential communication. From this integrated review, I glean three 
                                                
1 Dyads had positively interdependent goals: the success of each actor depended on the 
other (Deutsch, 1949; Johnson & Johnson, 1989). 
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hypotheses: referential communication generates conceptual homogeneity (H3) and 
enhances indirect category learning (H1), though simple rules are better learned than 
complex relationships (H2). The Method chapter provides details on the experimental 
design that I used to test these hypotheses, as well as on how and why I collected and 
analyzed the various data. Next, in the Results chapter, I highlight how the learning data 
and the linguistic data supported the hypotheses. Finally, I interpret the major findings in 
the Discussion chapter. In particular, I focus on how referential communication directs 
attention to relationships between features (perceptual and functional) and action. In 
addition, I argue that referring expressions may render such relationships more 
memorable and may provide explicit “rules” for otherwise implicit judgements. Finally, I 
speculate on whether communication pushes “public” conceptualizations and publicly-




II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
When faced with a new or unfamiliar joint activity, communicating actors quickly 
converge on ad hoc referential conventions (Garrod & Anderson, 1987; Brennan & 
Clark, 1996; et al.). These ad hoc conventions entail a system of shared or “public” 
categories of the objects, actions, and events in the activity environment. The shareability 
of a convention derives from the extent to which it minimizes the joint cognitive effort of 
sharing attention and intentions towards those objects, actions, and events (cf., Freyd, 
1983). In the wild, shareable conventions emerge from the coupled evolution of both the 
linguistic and extra-linguistic aspects of the various “public” categories during 
conversationally driven joint activity. I consider this evolution from the perspective of 
two research traditions: cognitive research on “private” category learning, both in general 
and with an explicit focus on lexically labeled categories; and psycho-linguistic research 
on conversation and referential communication. Integrating these traditions yields 
hypotheses about the “public” category learning entailed in the emergence of shareable 
conventions that one could not derive from either tradition alone. 
Plausible Constraints on Human Category Learning 
While conventions such as driving on the left-hand versus right-hand side of the 
road may seem arbitrary, one rarely finds an entirely arbitrary referential convention. As 
a system of “public” categorizations, a referential convention is subject to constraints on 
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the human conceptual system. Some constraints originate from outside human beings. 
For example, both the natural and artificial worlds exhibit structural regularities (e.g., 
Berlin, Breedlove, & Raven, 1966; Simon, 1956). Other constraints originate from within 
human beings. These include, limits on memory and selective attention (e.g., Shepard, 
Hovland, and Jenkins, 1961), the limits of embodiment (e.g., Gallese & Lakoff, 2005), 
and the limits of personal experience (e.g., Murphy & Medin, 1985), among others. 
Structural Constraints 
Among the various constraints addressed by the categorization and decision-
making literature, the structure of the features defining categories of objects, actions, and 
events appears to exert the most pervasive or, at least, most discernible influence on 
category learning and use (Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson, & Braem, 1976; Corter & 
Gluck, 1992; Simon, 1956; Todd & Gigerenzer, 2007). For example, population-wide 
regularities in how individuals name and classify various natural kinds, including colors 
(e.g, Kay et al., 2007 [2003]), kinship (e.g, Goodenough, 1965; Romney & D’Andrade, 
1964; Romney, Boyd, Moore, Batchelder, & Brazill, 1996), as well as plants and animals 
(e.g, Berlin, Breadlove & Raven, 1973; Diamond, 1966; Bulmer, 1967; Hunn, 1977), 
appear to reflect statistical regularities in the environment (Berlin et al., 1966; Rosch et 
al., 1976). This concordance holds even after one accounts for the arbitrary distinctions 
within any particular population-wide convention (Malt, Sloman, & Gennari, 2003a, 
2003b; Malt, Sloman, Gennari, Shi, & Wang, 1999). 
Moreover, individuals tend to name and identify categories of objects (e.g, Rosch 
et al., 1976; Jolicoeur, Gluck, & Kosslyn, 1984; Tversky & Hemenway, 1984; Murphy & 
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Smith, 1982), actions (Tomasello & Merriman, 1995; Vallacher & Wegner, 1987), and 
events (Morris & Murphy, 1990; Rifkin, 1985) at a level of abstraction—the so-called 
basic level—that permits the average person to infer the maximal number of 
differentiating features of those objects, actions, and events (Gluck & Corter, 1985). For 
example, if Alpha, the imaginary character from the Introduction, were talking to Bonita, 
a culinary novice, he would likely refer to the tagine as “the pot with the conical lid” 
instead of using the category label tagine or even braiser. Similar tendencies in the 
naming and identification of experimenter-designed categories suggest that statistical 
regularities in the environment may push human conception towards the most 
informative level (Corter, Gluck, & Bower, 1988; Murphy & Smith, 1982; Hoffmann & 
Ziessler, 1983). In fact, various analytical models (e.g, Gosselin & Schyns, 2001; Gluck 
& Corter, 1985; Rosch et al., 1976; Jones, 1983) can approximate the observed primacy 
of basic-level categorization as a function of featural information. 
Informational & Biological Constraints 
Phenomena like basic-level primacy appears so pervasive that one might 
speculate whether biological evolution has hard-wired certain conceptual structures (e.g, 
Atran, 2005; Medin & Atran, 2004; Shepard, 1992; Tooby & Cosmides, 1989; Rosch, 
1975). By this account, the tendencies to name and identify both natural and artificial 
kinds has evolved as an adaptive response to fairly persistent informational structures in 
the environment (Atran, 2005), and any observed deviations from such “universal” 
tendencies represents a devolution of the conceptual system (Atran, Medin, & Ross, 
2004). To a great extent, the adaptionist account relies on discontinuities between human 
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beings and other primates (Hauser, 2005). Nevertheless, many primate species exhibit 
homologous understandings of various concepts, such as small quantities (Dehaene, 
2001; Hauser, 2000; Hauser et al., 2000, 1996), gravity (Hood, Hauser, Anderson, & 
Santos, 1999), distinctions between living and artifactual kinds (Hauser, 1997), and 
functional distinctions among artifactual kinds (ibid.). Moreover, non-human primates 
trained to use arbitrary symbols can make abstract judgements that are seldom recognized 
in the wild (Thompson, Oden, & Boysen, 1997). 
For the most part, the differences between the human and non-human conceptual 
systems appear quantitative rather than qualitative (Deacon, 2000). A coupling of a 
quantitatively different conceptual system with quantitatively different capacities for 
opportunistic learning suffices to produce qualitatively different results (Wagner & 
Wagner, 2003). Add to that, a quantitatively different capacity for sharing mental states 
(e.g., Meltzoff & Andrew, 2007; Saxe, 2006; Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 
2005; Bloom, 2002) via heritable media (e.g., language and artifacts; cf.; Hutchins & 
Hazelhurst, 1992; Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman, 1983; Vygotsky, 1978), and strongly 
adaptionist accounts of the human conceptual system appear, at best, unnecessary (Gould 
& Lewontin, 1979).  
At most, one might argue that comparable sensori-motor capacities among human 
beings may yield comparable experiences and, thus, comparable conceptions of a 
common environment (Gallese & Lakoff, 2005; Pfeifer & Bongard, 2006). For instance, 
the particular configuration of the human body yields a particular experience of physical 
space, which may, in turn, yield a spatially-analogous structure to both concrete and 
abstract concepts (Moyer, 1973; Paivio, 1978; Tversky, 2005). 
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Structural & Cognitive Constraints 
Cognitive constraints, such as limits on working memory and selective attention, 
represent a less controversial expression of biology. Structural and cognitive constraints 
appear to intermingle in the oft-cited study by Shepard, Hovland, and Jenkins (1961), 
where varying the number and combination of diagnostic dimensions of artificial 
category structures varied the time and effort required to learn those structures (see also 
Nosofsky, Gluck, Palmieri, Mckinley, & Glauthier, 1994; Love, 2002). Assuming that 
category learners attempt to optimize selective attention across diagnostic dimensions, 
one could attribute the increasing cognitive effort directly to increasing demands on 
selective attention and working memory (e.g, Nosofsky et al., 1994). More often, though, 
category learners rely on satisficing solutions (Simon, 1955), inferring categories from 
the simplest description derivable from known exemplars (Feldman, 2003b; Chater & 
Vitányi, 2003). For example, in the Introduction, Beta relies on the diagnostic features of 
the familiar category light bulb—glass object containing a filament—to identify the 
unfamiliar fuse as a “mini bulb.” This sort of “fast and frugal” reasoning conserves 
cognitive resources (e.g, Todd & Gigerenzer, 2001; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996) and 
has been observed in categorical decision-making (Matsuka & Corter, In Press; Medin et 
al., 1987). 
That said, the extent of one’s “frugality” depends on the compressibility of the 
category structure (Feldman, 2000, 2003a, 2006). For example, Shepard et al. (1961) 
designed each of their six category structures using three binary dimensions, or twelve 
bits of information. Expressed as a Boolean equation, the category structure with one 
diagnostic dimension and two non-diagnostic dimensions compresses to one bit, while 
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the category structure with three diagnostic and nonlinearly separable dimensions 
compresses no smaller than ten bits of information. In other words, the simplest heuristic 
for learning the latter category structure would require nothing short of memorizing each 
category exemplar (e.g, Allen & Brooks, 1991). In the Introduction, Bonita’s difficulty in 
diagnosing Vanishing Bee Syndrome attests to the excessive cognitive effort required in 
learning and using an incompressible category structure. 
Structure, Cognition, and Activity 
The increasing effort required for learning increasingly complex structures may 
stem, in part, from the particular activity—classification—that dominates laboratory 
studies on categorization (for review, see Markman & Ross, 2003). The interplay 
between structural, cognitive, and activity-related constraints becomes obvious when one 
contrasts alternative uses of categories (ibid.)—e.g., classifying an object versus inferring 
its uncertain features. Whereas classification focuses attention on between-category 
featural information, those engaged in feature inference appear to allocate attention to 
within-category featural information, especially to specific feature values and the within-
category correlations among these values (Yamauchi & Markman, 1998, 2000a, 2000b). 
For example, if one needed to classify a particular brazier as either a tagine or a dutch 
oven, one would attend to the category differentiating features—ceramic vs. cast iron, 
conical lid vs. flat lid. Alternatively, if one needed to infer whether a particular pot was 
appropriate for braising a mutton shank, one would attend to the width, depth, and 
thickness of the pot as well as how tightly the lid fits. Those engaged in a classification 
task tend to learn simpler, more compressible, category structures more easily than 
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complex category structures (ibid.). Those engaged in an inference task learn both simple 
and complex category structures with comparable effort (ibid.). 
Activities that involve the indirect learning of categories—e.g, looking for 
patterns among stimuli or rating their pleasantness—appear similar to inference tasks in 
attentional strategy and the effort expended in learning simple versus complex category 
structures (Love, 2002, 2003). Minda & Ross (2004) serves as a noteworthy example of 
indirect category learning. Participants predicted the food allotment for a sequence of 
imaginary animals. Successful predictions required the learning of a complex category 
structure, where both a unidimensional rule and family resemblance (multidimensional 
rule) predicted the food allotment. While participants could rely on either or both rules, 
attentional strategies varied with whether or not a classification task (direct category 
learning) preceded the prediction task (indirect category learning). Those who classified 
animals before predicting food allotments relied on the simple rule; those who only 
predicted food allotment distributed their attention across multiple dimensions (see also 
Ross, 1997, 1999). 
Person-Related Constraints 
Other constraints derive from the person (Murphy & Medin, 1985), including his 
or her prior knowledge (e.g, Chi, Feltovich, & Glaser, 1981; Gauthier, Williams, Tarr, & 
Tanaka, 1998; Tanaka & Taylor, 1991; Murphy & Wright, 1984; Schvaneveldt et al., 
1985), current goals (Barsalou, 1983; Ratneshwar, Barsalou, Pechmann, & Moore, 2001), 
and the situational heuristics (e.g, Gluck, Shohamy, & Myers, 2002) that connect prior 
knowledge and current goals. These individual differences may elicit varying prior 
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expectations of how the objects, actions, and events of a new, rare, or unfamiliar activity 
relate to one another (c.f., Murphy & Medin, 1985). Moreover in trying to induce the 
actual relationships among the objects, actions, and events, differing individuals might 
use different heuristics (Lin & Murphy, 1997). In this way, person-related constraints can 
enhance or impede the learning of novel categories. For example, when Bonita and Belle 
build their computational simulation of Vanishing Bee Syndrome, they are likely to 
model complex interactions among variables like microwaves and genetically modified 
crops based on their prior expectations of a syndrome. Likewise, they are likely to 
exclude simple factors like mite infestation, which might account for many symptoms of 
the syndrome. Usually, when faced with contrary evidence, the category learner abandons 
misapplied prior hypotheses (Livingston & Andrews, 1995). The absence of glass 
cartridge fuses in the lighting aisle of the hardware store will prod Alpha and Beta 
towards the circuitry aisle. When prior hypotheses bear some resemblance to the 
observed evidence, though, mistaken hypotheses can persist and impede learning (ibid.). 
A simulation that includes microwaves and genetically modified crops but excludes mite 
infestation will not help beekeepers. 
Language Constraints 
What a category is called—the category label—and whether or not it is called 
anything at all can affect the learning and use of a category. Such effects fall short of the 
notion that language is thought (Davidson, 1975) or that language determines thought 
(Whorf, 1956), but goes far beyond the notion that category labels serve little purpose 
beyond that of another diagnostic feature among other diagnostic features (Anderson, 
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1991). Category labels appear to serve three interrelated functions: (1) as conceptual 
cues, (2) as conceptual manipulatives, (3) and as conceptual manipulators. 
Category labels as conceptual cues 
By the principle of contrast (E.V. Clark, 1987), different category labels signal 
different concepts. For example, labeling objects by different names can help children 
individuate those objects (Xu, 2002) and often leads them to look for differences among 
differently-labeled objects (Katz, 1963; Landau & Shipley, 2001) and for similarities 
among objects with the same name (Loewenstein & Gentner, 2005; Smith, Jones, & 
Landau, 1996; Waxman & Markow, 1995). Similarly, adults learn event categories better 
when verbs and/or syntax covaries with the events (Cabrera & Billman, 1996). Also, 
children often treat unknown labels as category labels for unknown objects and as feature 
labels for known objects (Markman & Wachtel, 1988). Finally, the mere presence of 
category labels can cue the category learner to look for meaningful patterns in what he or 
she perceives. Children tend to pay more attention to labeled categories than to unlabeled 
categories (Balaban & Waxman, 1997; Waxman & Booth, 2001) and adults learn labeled 
categories more quickly than unlabeled categories (Lupyan, Rakison, & McClelland, 
2007). In all, category labels appear to make abstractions concrete and implicit 
judgements explicit (A. Clark, 2006, Vygotsky, 1986 [1962]). 
Category labels as conceptual manipulatives  
The concreteness of category labels reduces the cognitive effort of reasoning from 
and about abstract and complex concepts, much like Cuisenaire rods reduce the effort of 
learning and using mathematical concepts. Among the examples of the cueing function of 
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labels, category learners may have offloaded burdensome feature comparisons onto the 
category labels between which differences and similarities are easy to discern (A. Clark 
& Karmiloff-Smith, 1993). Beyond differentiation, children rely more on category labels 
than perceptual similarity when inferring unknown features (Gelman & Markman, 1986), 
and use labels to simplify relational judgements (Kotovsky & Gentner, 1996). Moreover, 
labels anchor abstract concepts like large (Gordon, 2004) and exact numerosities 
(Gellman & Gallistel, 2004) as well as conceptual manipulations like exact mental 
arithmetic (Beller & Bender, 2008; Pica, Lemer, Izard, & Dehaene, 2004). Finally, 
labeling categories enhances visual search by reducing the search space to the category-
relevant features (Lupyan, 2008), or, put another way, by maximizing attention to 
diagnostic features. 
Category labels as conceptual manipulators 
This attentional control points to a third function of category labels: manipulating 
the attentional, perceptual, and memory-related processes of category learning and use 
(cf., Vygotsky, 1986 [1962], on how language scaffolds thought). For example, children 
appear to use the names of previously encountered objects to tune their attention to 
naming-relevant features of subsequently encountered objects (Smith, Jones, Landau, 
Gershkoff-Stowe, & Samuelson, 2002). When adults classify objects using basic-level 
category labels they remember and, perhaps, perceive those objects as more similar to the 
prototype of the labeled category (Lupyan, 2008; see also Carmichael, Hogan & Walter, 
1932; Daniel, 1972). Similarly, assigning descriptive labels to novel stimuli improves the 
sequential matching of those stimuli, a task heretofore considered exclusively visual. In 
contrast, describing the particular features of a particular face (Schooler and Engstler-
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Schooler, 1990) or a particular wine (Melcher & Schooler, 1996) can impair later 
recognition of that face or that wine. Surprisingly, describing a face in terms of 
prototypical features does not distort memory (MacLin, 2002). In all, category labels 
appear to manipulate the conceptual system via a top-down activation of category 
features that attracts attentional processes and colors or ocludes memory and perception.  
  Summary of Plausible Constraints 
Structure, complexity, language, and activity (along with embodiment and person-
related constraints) represent an A-list rather than a catalog of all plausible extra-
conversational constraints on referential convention. These A-list constraints appear 
obvious constituents of any overarching shareability constraint, each may affect the joint 
cognitive effort of sharing a concept. Nevertheless, few empirical researchers have 
examined how referential communication might amplify, dampen, or distort these 
constraints (for exceptions see Markman & Makin, 1998, and Malt & Sloman, 2004). 
Intuitively, one might suspect that structural regularities in the world and the complexity 
of those structures should constrain communicating individuals in ways similar to 
isolated individuals, but how and to what extent is not certain. Moreover, many of the 
studies on use and usefulness of category labels assume that one can decouple language 
from communication. Language is for communicating, and communicating is for thinking 
jointly and in public (cf., Wittgenstein, 2001 [1958]). The use of language requires both a 
self and an other—whether actual or implied. 
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Conceptual Coordination Via the Processes of Referential Communication 
Referential Games 
In new or rare or unfamiliar joint activities, actors often coordinate their actions 
through conversation (Clark, 1996). Since Wittgenstein (2001 [1958]), the processes of 
conversation, in general, and referential communication, in particular, have often been 
formulated as a game (cf., Higgins, 1981; Crawford & Sobel, 1982; Blume, Dejong, Kim, 
& Sprinkle, 1998; Pietarinen, 2006). The players, as speaker and addressee, set the rules 
of play and keep score through their ongoing joint construal of the various referents and 
their significance to the activity (Lewis, 1979). Coordination proceeds through a turn-
taking process where, at any iteration, a speaker will refer to some object, action or event 
in the activity environment. The speaker’s use of a particular reference at a particular 
level of reference functions as a public categorization of the referent, differentiating the 
referent and highlighting its significance to the activity (see Russell, 1905; Brown, 1958; 
Grice, 1975; Cruse, 1977; Barr & Kronmüller, 2006 for various formulations of the 
conceptual function of reference). In reply, the addressee can ratify the proposed 
categorization, seek clarification, or offer a counter-proposal (cf., Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 
1986; Sacks et al., 1974; Clark & Krych, 2004; Hulstijn & Maudet, 2006; W. Deutsch & 
Pechmann, 1982). The conversational turn continues until joint-construal is confirmed. 
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Coordination of Attention and Intention in Referential Games 
To illustrate such a game, imagine Bonita and Belle collaborating in what for 
them is a novel activity, cooking. Rummaging in the pantry for ingredients, Bonita 
requests, “could you sharpen the big knife?” Grasping a carving knife, Belle asks, “this 
long one?” “Is it big?” Bonita checks, to which Belle insists, “long is big.” “Fine, the 
wide one,” clarifies Bonita. Carrying shallots from the pantry, Bonita finds a sharpened 
cleaver on her cutting board and responds, “well, you can use that to hack apart the rib 
chops, but that’s not a dicing tool.” “It’s wide,” persists Belle. “I need the one that widens 
from a point to a round belly,” Bonita further clarifies. “Oh, this one,” pulling the chef’s 
knife from the block; “it’s like half a bow” she counter proposes. “Yes,” Bonita confirms, 
“the half-bow knife.” 
From Private to Public Categories… 
Early in conversation, each actor is likely to propose and/or counter-propose 
relatively idiosyncratic or private categorizations of the objects, actions, and event in the 
activity environment (Horton & Keysar, 1996; Keysar, Barr, Balin, & Brauner, 2000; 
Keysar, Barr, Balin, & Paek, 1998; Kronmüller & Barr, 2007; Furnas, Landauer, Gomez, 
& Dumais, 1987). Like Bonita and Belle, they may differ in perspective (Barsalou & 
Sewell, 1984; Keysar, Lin, & Barr, 2003), intentions (Barresi & Moore, 1996), 
knowledge (Chi et al., 1981; Gauthier et al., 1998; Tanaka & Taylor, 1991; Murphy & 
Wright, 1984; Schvaneveldt et al., 1985), and goals (Barsalou, 1983; Ratneshwar et al., 
2001). Thus, each actor might approach a novel activity with differing expectations (c.f., 
Murphy & Medin, 1985) and use differing heuristics (cf. Lin & Murphy, 1997). For 
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example, Bonita uses the heuristic big => wide, while Belle uses the heuristic big => 
long. With each iteration of proposal/counter-proposal and ratification/clarification, each 
actor relies increasingly on publicly available information, shifting from private to public 
categories (cf., Fussell & Krauss, 1989; Krauss & Fussell, 1991; Clark & Brennan, 1991). 
Joint Attention, Joint Intention, and Joint Reference 
With each iteration of proposal/counter-proposal and ratification/clarification, 
actors establish joint attention to publicly relevant features of the referent (Clark, 1972; 
Clark et al., 1983; Tomasello & Farrar, 1986; Kaplan & Hafner, 2006; Tomasello, 1999). 
In particular, actors direct each other's attention (Kronmüller & Barr, 2007; Metzing & 
Brennan, 2003; Baldwin, 1991) to those features that allow each of them to differentiate 
the target referent from other possible referents (E.V. Clark, 1987; Mervis & Crisafi, 
1982; Murphy & Brownell, 1985) and to infer the referent's significance to the activity 
(Brown, 1958; Gluck & Corter, 1985). For instance, Bonita directs Belle’s attention to 
the widening curve of the chef’s knife, which both differentiates it from the carving knife 
and, perhaps, suggests its function as a precise cutting tool. Further, actors establish the 
joint intention to act on the referent to accomplish mutual goals (Clark & Lucy, 1975; 
Francik & Clark, 1985; Tomasello et al., 2005). Bonita and Belle jointly intend the 
sharpening of the chef’s knife. More importantly, having established joint reference to 
“the half-bow knife,” Bonita and Belle are likely to reuse this precedent (Brennan & 
Clark, 1996), reducing the effort of sharing attention and intentions on subsequent 
conversational turns (Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986). 
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From Joint Reference to Referential Convention 
Often, over the course of a conversation, these referential precedents develop into 
mutually-known, mutually-salient, and mutually-expected associations between reference 
and concept—i.e. a referential convention. Such ad hoc conventions derive from 
opportunistic and/or pre-conscious learning coupled with the dynamics of conversation. 
In the scenario, Bonita ratifies Belle’s proposed conceptualization “it’s like half a bow” 
with the name-like reference “the half-bow knife.” This might represent opportunistic 
learning, where Bonita exploits the opportunity for repeated success in referring to the 
chef’s knife. This might also represent pre-conscious learning, where Bonita speaks what 
she hears due either to the common coding of comprehension and production or some 
other priming mechanism (see Pickering & Garrod, 2004, 2006 on pre-conscious 
linguistic coordination; also see Prinz, 1990, and Liberman & Whalen, 2000 on common 
coding). In either case, a recently used reference is frequently reused, and a frequently 
used reference is mutually available and mutually expected for further reuse (Brennan & 
Clark, 1996). This process drastically reduces the lexical variability between 
communicating actors, often leading to referential conventions that one could not predict 
from common usage patterns and/or normative theories (Barr & Keysar, 2002; Brennan 
& Clark, 1996; W. Deutsch & Pechmann, 1982; Pechmann, 1989). 
One common example is the over-specification of reference—i.e. using a 
reference that is more specific than the situation requires. Grice’s Maxims of Quantity 
exhort the speaker to “1. [m]ake your contribution as informative as is required (for the 
current purposes of the exchange) [, and] 2. [d]o not make your contribution more 
informative than is required” (1975, p. 45). Nevertheless, having established a 
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subordinate-level precedent—e.g., tagine—communicating actors expect each other to 
adhere to that precedent even when a basic-level reference—e.g., brazier or pot—would 
convey information sufficient for the joint activity (Brennan & Clark, 1996; Barr & 
Keysar, 2002). Moreover, these over-specified references usually persist into subsequent 
conversations with different conversational partners (ibid.). 
From Public to Private Categories 
A phenomenon like persistent over-specification seems unremarkable if one 
accepts that reference does more than label or index objects, actions, and events. In fact, a 
“public” category can persist beyond the confines of a conversation. Communicating 
actors often continue to use the “public” categories even in extra-linguistic activities that 
each performs in private. Studies by Markman & Makin (1998) and by Malt & Sloman 
(2004) illustrate this phenomenon more forcefully than would another imaginary scenario 
with Alpha and Beta or Bonita and Belle talking to each other. 
Markman & Makin examined the effects of referential communication on 
category coherence beyond what a person learns from individual activity or perceptual 
similarity. They divided participants into three groups. In the sort-only group, individual 
participants simply sorted Lego blocks. In the build-sort group, individuals first built a 
Lego model, then sorted the blocks. Finally, in the joint-build group dyads collaborated in 
building a Lego Model, then sorted on their own. Before the building task, each dyad had 
to negotiate a referential lexicon for the various Lego blocks. During the building task, 
one member of each dyad built the Lego model while the other member described the 
pictorial directions (which the builder could not see).  
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Dyads generally adhered to their negotiated referential conventions. Also, while 
each dyadic lexicon differed in its particulars, they shared similar mappings between 
lexical references and the structural hierarchy of Lego blocks. The lexemes tended to 
refer to basic-level categories of blocks, and modified lexemes tended to refer to 
subordinate categories of those blocks. More importantly, “public” categorizations appear 
to percolate into private conceptualizations. 
Absent the model-building context or any conversation, the sort-only group sorted 
blocks differently from one another. The experience of building the Lego model 
moderated variability in the sorts produced by the build-sort group. Adding referential 
communication to the building process reduced both within-dyad and between-dyad 
variability most of all; participants in the joint-build group sorted blocks much like their 
partners and much like members of other dyads. 
Malt & Sloman (2004) observed similar effects when they examined the 
propagation of referential conventions through a serially conversing activity group. 
Participants jointly arranged photographs of common artifacts, each identifiable by two 
equally common or “balanced” names–e.g. bucket vs. pail and trashcan vs. wastebasket 
(see Malt & Sloman, 2004, for how they determined "balance"). Participants collaborated 
once with a confederate and once with each other. The confederate served as the first 
speaker, introducing one of the two balanced names–e.g, “bucket” instead of “pail”–for 
each of the target artifacts to the first-round participant. The first-round participant then 
served as speaker in collaboration with a second-round participant. The second-round 
participant then served as speaker in collaboration with the confederate. As elsewhere 
(e.g. Garrod & Deherty, 1994), when participants switched roles from addressee to 
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speaker, they usually attempted to transfer the referential conventions established in 
conversation with the previous speaker to conversations with subsequent addressee. 
Following the collaborative card sorting, participants provided individual 
preference, typicality, and similarity ratings for each of the name pairs and the various 
target objects. Malt & Sloman found that, both when engaged in the joint activity and 
following the joint activity, participants overwhelmingly preferred to use the names 
introduced by the confederate over the other equally valid and equally common artifact 
names. Further, participants judged activity-related artifacts as more typical of categories 
named in conformity with the referential convention. Finally, participants judged activity-
related artifacts as more similar to imagined prototypes of categories named in 
conformity with the referential convention. Again, “public” categorizations appear to 
percolate into “private” conceptualizations. 
Conclusion and Hypotheses 
This overview of the literature on “private” category learning and on referential 
communication provides an integrated perspective on “public” categorization and the 
emergence of shareable referential conventions that one could not derive from either 
research tradition alone. The categorization literature exposes several constraints—
including structure, complexity, language, and activity—that limit or enhance category 
learning and use among isolated individuals. The communication literature elaborates the 
process by which “private” conceptualizations become “public” conceptualizations and 
vice versa. Few studies have examined whether and how individual-level constraints 
operate among communicating actors. The present study looks explicitly at the 
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interaction of referential communication and the structure of perceptual features on the 
joint processes of inventing a referential lexicon for novel objects and discovering the 
functional significance of those objects during a novel activity. Specifically, I test three 
hypotheses: 
H1. Referential communication enhances indirect category learning 
This hypothesis is original to the present study. Previous research (Markman & 
Makin 1998) comparing “public” versus “private” category learning used stimuli 
for which there were multiple potential category configurations. So, one could not 
discern whether “public” categorizations were in any way better than “private” 
categorizations, only whether “public” and “private categorizations were different 
from one another. 
Nevertheless, referential communication directs the joint attention and 
joint actions of communicating actors. Moreover, reference can be used to cue 
and compress concepts. Thus one should expect those engaged in a “public” 
categorization activity to learn unlabeled categories better than those engaged in a 
“private” categorization activity. 
H2. Referential communication enhances the learning of simple rules more 
than complex rules 
This hypothesis is also original to the present study. Again, previous research 
(Markman & Makin 1998) comparing “public” versus “private” category learning 
did not further compare the learning of simple versus complex rules. Moreover, 
isolated individuals engaged in indirect category learning tend to use both simple 
and complex rules with comparable facility (Minda & Ross, 2004). 
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Nevertheless, communicating actors may articulate and comprehend 
simple relationships between the referent's features and its significance to the 
activity more quickly and easily than complex relationships. Moreover, they may 
more quickly and easily cue and compress those concepts. Thus, one should 
expect those engaged in a “public” categorization activity to learn simple 
relationships more quickly and easily than complex relationships. 
H3. Referential communication generates conceptual homogeneity  
Communicating actors tend to conceive of activity related objects in ways similar 
to their partners (Garrod & Anderson, 1987; Brennan & Clark, 1996; et al.) and in 
ways similar to others engaged in the same joint activity (Markman & Makin, 
1998). The present study should replicate this phenomenon. In other words, one 
should expect greater conceptual homogeneity among those engaged in a “public” 





Purpose & Overview 
With the present study, I investigated the interaction of referential communication 
and the structure of perceptual features on the joint processes of inventing a referential 
lexicon for novel objects and discovering the functional significance of those objects 
during an indirect category learning activity. To that end, participants worked either 
individually or as cooperative2 dyads to learn four combinations of orthogonal functional 
features—nutritive vs. not nutritive and destructive vs. not destructive—that defined four 
categories of fictional extra-terrestrial creatures. These categories were not specifically 
identified or labeled; rather, participants had to learn them indirectly as they predicted the 
functions. Also, these functionally defined categories possessed a complex perceptual 
structure: a unidimensional (simple) rule predicted one function, while a family 
resemblance (complex) sub-structure predicted the other function. This function-learning 
task yielded function prediction data.  In addition to the main function-learning task, each 
learner worked individually to sort the creatures (pre- and post-function learning) and to 
predict their functions in an individual function prediction posttest that also yielded 
selective attention data. 
                                                
2 Dyads had positively interdependent goals: the success of each actor depended on the 
other (Deutsch, 1949; Johnson & Johnson, 1989). 
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Together with data extracted from the transcripts of the dyadic conversations, the 
prediction data, sort data, and selective attention data demonstrate the extent to which: 
H1. referential communication enhances indirect category learning; 
H2. the learning advantages of dyadic learners vary with the complexity of the 
category structure; and 
H3. referential communication generates conceptual homogeneity. 
Participants 
Thirty-five male and thirty-seven female students (mean age 25.1) from throughout the 
Columbia University community participated in this study for a cash payment. 
Participants were recruited using flyers posted widely across the university campus. The 
flyer promised a cash payment for participation and a digital audio player for the best 
performing participant. All participants were native speakers of the English language, 
with an average of four years of post-secondary schooling during which they devoted an 
average of two (or fewer) hours per week to computer games.  
Design 
Three independent variables were manipulated in the design of this study. 
Learning context served as a between-subjects factor with three levels—dyadic learning 
(N=32) versus individual learning with 160 trials (N=16) versus individual learning with 
320 trials (N=24). The two individual learning conditions were created in response to 
difficulties in establishing an equivalent control condition to dyadic learning. Each dyadic 
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learner described stimuli on 160 learning trials and heard descriptions of stimuli on an 
additional 160 learning trials. Moreover, they received corrective feedback on predictions 
for all 320 trials. One could debate whether acting on a verbal description of an unseen 
stimulus leads to the same learning as both seeing and acting on a stimulus. So, the two 
individual learning conditions each represent the two boundary conditions: 160 versus 
320 learning trials. Learning trials were divided into blocks of thirty-two trials. Block 
served as a within-subjects factor with either five or ten levels, depending on which 
learning conditions were compared. Finally, type of rule served as a within-subjects 
factor with two levels—simple rule versus family resemblance.  
Log files generated during each task for each participant provided data on the 
effects these manipulations had on four dependent variables that capture aspects of 
category learning: 
1. the accuracy with which participants predicted the functional features; 
2. the structural similarity of participant sorts to the "true" category structure, its 
sub-structures, or the sorts of other participants;  
3. the type of explanation participants cited for their sorts, and 
4. the attention allocated to surface features when making predictions. 
In addition, transcripts of the dyadic conversations provided data on the probability with 




The Design of the Category Structure 
Six observable dimensions (O1-O6) and two functional dimensions (F1 and F2) defined 
the category structure used in this study (Table 1). The four combinations of binary 
values on F1 and F2 defined four categories, while sixteen combinations of binary values 
on O1-O5 defined the sixteen exemplars. The distribution of exemplar-defining value 
combinations met several criteria: each category entailed four unique exemplars, among 
which similar value combinations on O1-O3 predicted the value on F1 (family 
resemblance rule type), the value on O4 predicted the value on F2 (simple rule type), 
while the value on the O5 did not predict the value on any other dimension. Adding a 
modicum of naturalistic noise, O6 varied randomly across a range of possible values. The 
values on O6 did not predict the value on any other dimension. 
Table 1. Category Structure represented in binary notation. 
  Observable Dimensions Functional 
  Diagnostic Non-Diagnostic Dimensions 
EXEMPLAR O1 O2 O3 O4 O5 O6 F1 F2 
ND.1 1 1 1 1 1 random 1 1 
ND.2 1 1 0 1 1 random 1 1 
ND.3 1 0 1 1 0 random 1 1 
ND.4 0 1 1 1 0 random 1 1 
Nx.1 1 1 1 0 0 random 1 0 
Nx.2 1 1 0 0 0 random 1 0 
Nx.3 1 0 1 0 1 random 1 0 
Nx.4 0 1 1 0 1 random 1 0 
xD.1 1 0 0 1 1 random 0 1 
xD.2 0 1 0 1 1 random 0 1 
xD.3 0 0 1 1 0 random 0 1 
xD.4 0 0 0 1 0 random 0 1 
xx.1 1 0 0 0 0 random 0 0 
xx.2 0 1 0 0 0 random 0 0 
xx.3 0 0 1 0 1 random 0 0 
xx.4 0 0 0 0 1 random 0 0 
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Observable dimensions O1-O3 jointly predict functional dimension F1. Observable 
dimension O4 predicts functional dimension F2. The assignment of the perceptual 
features of stimuli to O1-O4 and the functional features to F1-F2 was counterbalanced. 
 
The Design of the Stimuli 
Computer graphics of fictional extra-terrestrial creatures instantiated this category 
structure (using the Squeak variant of Smalltalk, in a 32-bit graphical environment). Each 
creature possessed four diagnostic observable features—tentacles (T), fins (F), torso 
animation (A), and eyes (E)—which varied between two levels (Figure B1 illustrates the 
two levels for each physical feature). Four permutations of these physical features—(1) 
TFAE, (2) ETFA, (3) AETF, (4) FAET—were assigned to dimensions O1-O4 in order to 
counterbalance any effects due to prior expectations of physical/functional correlations. 
The fill colors and border colors (dimension O5) assigned to these physical features 
remained either stable (one of two non-predictive values) or constant. Also, the size 
(dimension O6) of each rendered creature varied in scale, from 90 to 110 percent (in 
increments of 1%) of the basic creature size. This subtle source of variation was meant to 
add a modicum of naturalistic noise to the category structure. 
Participants encountered these creatures in the context of a computer-based video 
game (installed on Apple iMac computers). The scenario (Figure C1) for the game 
presented the learning task and the pre- and post-tests as training materials for an 
imaginary mission to another planet, where the “astronaut” would encounter extra-
terrestrial creatures. Creatures might or might not offer nutritive value (described as a 
“jelly” that could serve either as food or bio-fuel) and might or might not be destructive 
(described as damage to “life support systems”). Successful game play required 
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participants to learn how to discriminate between four functionally-defined creature 
categories—nutritive & destructive (ND), nutritive only (NX), destructive only (XD), or 
no functional significance (XX). The counterbalanced assignment of functional features 
to dimensions F1 and F2 was meant to account for any effects due to function/rule-type 
pairings.  
Tasks 
The Function Prediction Task 
Across learning contexts, participants used the Function Prediction task to learn 
the functional combinations that defined the four unlabeled categories of creatures (see 
Minda & Ross, 2004, and Monos, 1997, for similar tasks). Participants could learn the 
four categories indirectly by learning the functional combinations. A time-stamped log of 
their predictions provided data on both their prediction accuracy. The Function 
Prediction task entailed two separable roles: the spotter, who saw the creature; and the 
beamer, who performed the prediction-related action. In the dyadic learning context, each 
participant’s initial role was assigned randomly on the first Function Prediction trial and 
alternated on each subsequent trial. In each of the individual learning contexts, each 
participant played both roles. 
On each trial, one of the sixteen creatures appeared at the center of the spotter’s 
Function Prediction interface (Figure C2 A & B), where it remained until an action was 
executed or twenty seconds had elapsed. If playing with a partner, the spotter had fifteen 
seconds to describe the creature to the beamer, leaving the beamer  five seconds (each 
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second marked by a tone) to decide which functional combination—ND, NX, XD, or 
XX—the creature entailed and take the functionally-appropriate action—respectively, 
stun & capture, stun, capture, or pass. Across learning contexts, the beamer executed 
these actions with keystrokes on a standard computer keyboard. Individually, the 
<CTRL> key meant “activate tractor beam,” the <OPTION> key meant “activate stun 
beam,” and the <SPACE> key meant “fire” (execute the selected action).  Thus, <CTRL-
OPTION-SPACE> executed stun & capture, <OPTION-SPACE> executed stun, 
<CTRL-SPACE> executed capture, and <SPACE> executed pass. An instructions screen 
offered participants detailed descriptions of key combinations (Figure C3 A & B); a 
color-coded summary of key combinations (Figure C2 A & Figure C4) appeared along 
the bottom of the beamer’s Function Prediction interface. 
In response to each key combination, the background of the Function Prediction 
interface flashed the action-appropriate color (as defined by the color-coded summary), 
after which visual and aural feedback signaled the functionally-related consequences of 
the chosen action. First, either a positive or negative tone indicated whether or not the 
participant executed a functionally appropriate action. Then, a synthesized voice 
(specifically, the IBM Expressive Speech System, Hamza, Bakis, Eide, Picheny, & 
Pitrelli, 2004) described the functionally-related consequences of the chosen action. For 
example, after capturing a NX creature, participants heard “jelly extracted;” alternatively, 
participants who stunned & captured an NX creature, heard “stun beam wasted, some 
jelly extracted.” Descriptive feedback reinforced even partially correct predictions, while 
correcting mistaken predictions. Table A specifies the descriptive feedback for each 
function by prediction pairing. Finally, a graphical energy meter (e.g., Figure C4) 
35 
 
provided additional positive or negative feedback, namely a five to fifteen unit (pixel) 
increase or decrease in energy (length). As with the descriptive feedback, the energy 
meter reinforced even partially correct predictions, either granting partial points or 
dampening penalties. Table A specifies the rewards and penalties for each 
function/prediction pairing. The Function Prediction task continued for either five or ten 
blocks of trials (depending on learning context), during which each of the sixteen 
creatures appeared twice in random order. 
The Sorting Tasks 
An individually-performed sorting task preceded (PRE) and followed (POST) the 
Function Prediction task. The two sort tasks differed only in what knowledge about 
functional features was available to participants. During the PRE-sort task, participants 
had no knowledge about the functional significance of the creatures; during the POST-
sort task, participants could use what knowledge they had gleaned from the Function 
Prediction task. At the start of each sort task, all sixteen creatures were rendered at 15% 
of their normal size (in order to fit on the computer screen; see Figure C5) and were 
presented randomly in a two-column graphical container (along the left hand side of the 
screen). While one could discern observable features at the reduced size, dragging a 
creature onto the desktop allowed participants to view it at full size. Participants were 
encouraged (see sorting instructions, Figure C6 A & B) to perform a full-size inspection 
before deciding on how to sort each creature. In order to sort creatures, participants 
created a number of graphical containers into which they dragged the creatures they 
believed belonged together. Upon dragging a creature into a newly-created sorting 
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container, an explanation field appeared in the container, into which participants were 
instructed to provide a short explanation of why the creatures in the container belonged 
together. Participants could explain or edit that explanation at any time during the sorting 
process. Participants were free to create as many or as few categories (from one to 
sixteen) as they deemed necessary. 
The Attention Allocation Task 
The Attention Allocation task captured data on the attention participants allocated 
to the various physical features when deciding which functional combination—ND, NX, 
XD, or XX—the creatures entailed. The Attention Allocation task replicated the single-
player Function Prediction task in all aspects except that each creature appeared with its 
various physical features hidden by graphical blinds (Figure C7). In order to uncover a 
feature, participants mouse-clicked its blind. Participants were instructed to uncover as 
many parts as they needed in order to decide each creature’s functional significance—
ND, NX, XD, or XX—and whether to stun & capture, stun, capture, or pass (for 
instructions, screen see Figure C8). Also unlike the Function Prediction task, the 
Attention Allocation task lasted for a single block of thirty-two trials, during which each 
of the sixteen creatures appeared twice in random order. 
Procedure 
Participants were scheduled as pairs for “gaming” sessions, each of which had 
been randomly designated as dyadic, individual-160, or individual-320 sessions and 
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assigned one of the four physical permutations and one of the two functional 
permutations. After granting informed consent, participants completed a short 
questionnaire, providing their age, gender, years of post-secondary schooling, and the 
number of hours per week devoted to computer-game play. They were then seated at a 
computer terminal on either side of a 5’x5’ barrier, beyond which each participant could 
hear but not see the other. There, each observed a demonstration of the “game” interface 
and was given time to practice the use of the keyboard and mouse. Participants then 
proceeded through each of the four tasks: PRE-sort, function prediction, POST-sort, and 
attention allocation. Before each task, participants were permitted to seek clarification of 
the on-screen instructions. After completion of all tasks, each participant was debriefed. 
Data Analysis 
Deriving measures of prediction accuracy 
For each individual learner, the Function Prediction task logs recorded the 
stimulus (represented as a vector of values on dimensions O1-O4 and F1-F2) that was 
presented on each trial along with the functional combination—nutritive & destructive, 
nutritive only, destructive only, or no functional significance—with which the learner 
responded to the stimulus. Similarly, for each dyad, the Function Prediction task logs 
recorded each stimulus that the learner “spotted” or heard described along with the 
response provided by the learner or his or her partner. As with the Function Prediction 
logs for individual learners, the Attention Allocation task logs for both dyadic and 
individual learners recorded the stimuli and responses of each participant. 
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Averaging correct responses (correctly predicted functional combinations) across 
blocks of thirty-two trials (two presentations of each stimulus) yielded the functional-
category prediction accuracy rates for individuals, dyads3, and, during the Attention 
Allocation task, for individual dyadic learners. The same procedure for correct 
predictions of each function yielded function-prediction accuracy rates. 
Deriving measures of attention allocation 
In addition to the prediction data, the Attention Allocation task logs recorded 
what features each learner uncovered before responding with a function prediction. For 
each learner, these data yielded the average number of features uncovered per stimulus. 
Further, these data were converted into two probabilities: the probability of uncovering a 
family resemblance feature and the probability of uncovering a simple rule feature. 
Specifically, the number of family resemblance features uncovered by each learner was 
summed across Attention Allocation trials then normalized by the maximum number of 
family resemblance features the learner could have uncovered. The probability of 
uncovering a simple rule feature was derived in the same way. 
                                                
3 The responses of dyad members are dependent on one another during the Function 
Prediction task; thus, the dyad rather than the dyad member serves as the unit of analysis. 
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Deriving types of sorting explanations & measures of structural similarity 
The logs recorded during the sorting tasks that preceded (PRE) and followed 
(POST) the Function Prediction task provided data on which creatures were sorted 
together as well as the explanations participants used to justify these creature clusters. 
The explanations were segmented and coded as either function/behaviorally 
related (citing ± nutritive and ± destructive and/or ± capture and ± stun) or perceptually 
related (citing the surface features). Additionally, both function-related and perceptually-
related explanations were coded as either family resemblance related (citing a feature or 
function related to the family resemblance substructure) or simple rule related (citing a 
feature or function related to the simple rule substructure). Normalizing the frequency of 
each type of explanation by the number of creature clusters times the number of 
explanation types yielded the probability of mentioning that type of feature. Similarly, 
normalizing the frequency of explanations that cited functional/behavioral combinations 
by the number of creature clusters yielded the probability of mentioning a functional 
category. 
To derive measures of structural similarity, each participant’s post-learning 
creature groups were converted into binary co-occurrence matrices. Three additional 
matrices, represented co-occurrence based on (1) the “true” category clusters, (2) the 
destructive-function category clusters, and (3) the nutritive-function category clusters. 
The lower triangle (the binary values below the diagonal) of each co-occurrence matrix 
was rearranged as a vector. The jaccard similarity (which is appropriate for binary 
presence/absence data; Jaccard, 1912) between the various co-occurrence vectors served 
40 
 
as an indicator of structural similarity. Structural similarity was used to test inter-




Overall, the results demonstrate that dyadic learners learned the functionally 
defined categories more quickly and more accurately than individual learners. Also, 
dyadic learners exhibited greater conceptual homogeneity than individual learners. 
Nevertheless, the dyadic advantage in learning functions appeared earlier and was greater 
for the simple-rule predicted function than for the family-resemblance predicted function. 
Referential communication enhances indirect category learning 
Functional-category prediction accuracy 
Dyadic learners predicted functionally defined categories with greater accuracy 
than did individual learners. Participants in the two individual learning contexts were 
similarly accurate in predicting functional categories during the initial five blocks of 
learning trials (1-160)4. This dyadic advantage is evident in Figure 1 (below), where three 
accuracy curves compare functional-category prediction accuracy rates by learning 
context across the initial five blocks of learning trials (1-160) and across the final five 
blocks of learning trials (161-320). 
Moreover, this early dyadic advantage was corroborated by a repeated-measures 
ANOVA on the functional-category prediction accuracy rate with learning context as a 
                                                
4 Unless otherwise noted, data from the two individual learning conditions were 
combined for statistical tests relating to learning trials 1-160. 
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between-subjects factor and block (the five blocks that entailed learning trials 1-160) as a 
within-subjects factor. The interaction of learning context and block was significant—
! 
F(4,216) =10.522 , 
! 
p < .000, 
! 
ˆ " 2 = .163—as were the main effects of learning context—
! 
F(1,54 ) =14.839 , 
! 
p < .000, 
! 
ˆ " 2 = .216—and block—
! 
F(4,216) = 21.021, 
! 
p < .000, 
! 
ˆ " 2 = .280 . 
On average across the first 160 learning trials, dyadic learners predicted functional 
categories with an accuracy rate that increased more steeply than the accuracy rate of 
individual learners. 
 
Figure 1. Compares the rate of functional-category prediction accuracy of dyadic learners 
vs. individual learners (both individuals who completed 160 learning trials and 




The continued dyadic advantage was also corroborated by a repeated-measures 
ANOVA on the functional-category prediction accuracy rate with learning context5 as a 
between-subjects factor and block (the five blocks that entailed learning trials 161-320) as 
a within-subjects factor. Again, the interaction of learning context and block was 
significant—
! 
F(4,152) = 8.980 , 
! 
p < .000, 
! 
ˆ " 2 = .191—as were the main effects of learning 
context—
! 
F(1,38) = 30.858 , 
! 
p < .000, 
! 
ˆ " 2 = .448—and block—
! 
F(4,152) = 23.804 , 
! 
p < .000, 
! 
ˆ " 2 = .328 . On average across the final 160 learning trials, dyadic learners predicted 
functional categories with an accuracy rate that continued to increase more steeply than 
the accuracy rate of individual learners. 
 
Figure 2. Compares the rate of functional-category prediction accuracy of dyadic learners 
vs. individual learners (both individuals who completed 160 learning trials and 
individuals who completed 320 learning trials) during the Attention Allocation task. Error 
bars indicate confidence interval. 
 
                                                
5 Unless otherwise noted statistical tests relating to learning trials 161-320 compared 




Figure 3. Compares the average number of features per stimulus that dyadic learners vs. 
individual learners (both individuals who completed 160 learning trials and individuals 
who completed 320 learning trials) uncovered during the Attention Allocation task. Error 
bars indicate confidence interval. 
Posttest category prediction accuracy and attention allocation 
The dyadic advantage persists into the attention allocation task (Figure 2). Not 
surprisingly, attention allocation—as represented by the average number of features 







p < .000. A MANOVA on the functional-category prediction 
accuracy rate and attention allocation (features per stimulus) with learning context6 as a 
between-subjects factor yielded a significant multivariate effect—
! 
F(2,69) = 26.669 , 
! 
p < .000, 
! 
ˆ " 2 = .249—as well as significant univariate effects on functional-category 
prediction accuracy—
! 
F(1,70) = 51.022 , 
! 
p < .000, 
! 
ˆ " 2 = .422—and on attention allocation—
                                                
6 Unless otherwise noted, data from the two individual learning conditions were 




F(1,70) =14.275 , 
! 
p < .000, 
! 
ˆ " 2 = .169 . On average, during the attention allocation task, 
dyadic learners predicted functional categories with greater accuracy than individual 
learners—
! 
M(dyad ) = .697 (
! 






SD = .195)—while uncovering a 
greater number of perceptual features than individual learners—
! 
M(dyad ) = 3.165  
(
! 






SD = .954). 
Further, participants needed to uncover at least three features to determine the 
functional category of a stimulus. The mean number of features uncovered by dyadic 
learners, 3.165 (
! 
SD = .743), did not differ significantly from that minimum—
! 
t(31) =1.256 , 
! 
p = .219. The mean number of features uncovered by individual learners, 
2.388 (
! 
SD = .954), fell short of the minimum—
! 
t(39) = -4.057, 
! 
p < .000. 
 
 
Figure 4. Compares the structural similarity of the post-learning sort clusters produced 
by dyadic learners and individual learners (both individuals who completed 160 learning 
trials and individuals who completed 320 learning trials) to the “true” category clusters. 





Figure 5. Compares the probability of citing a category (whether functionally-defined or 
behaviorally-defined) when dyadic learners vs. individual learners (both individuals who 
completed 160 learning trials and individuals who completed 320 learning trials) 
explained their post-learning sort clusters. Error bars indicate confidence interval. 
The structure of post-learning sort clusters 
The dyadic learning advantage was also evident in how participants sorted 
creatures after the function prediction task. As described in the Data Analysis section of 
the Method chapter, post-learning sort clusters and the “true” category clusters were 
converted into binary co-occurrence matrices, each of which was rearranged as a vector. 
The jaccard similarity between each of the various co-occurrence vectors served as an 
indicator of structural similarity between clusters. As apparent in Figure 4, the post-
learning sort clusters of dyadic learners were more similar to the “true” category clusters 
than were the post-learning sort clusters of individual learners—
! 
M
(dyad ) = .471 
(
! 






SD = .172). Moreover, in explaining their sorts (Figure 
5), dyadic learners cited functional and/or behavioral categories (the beams used in 
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response to stimuli) with greater likelihood than did individual learners—
! 
M(dyad ) = .486 
(
! 






SD = .344). The similarly of the post-learning sort 
clusters and the “true” category clusters correlated with the reliance on category-related 
explanations of those clusters—
! 
r(sim.,exp lain ) = .614 , 
! 
p < .000. 
The differences between learning contexts were corroborated by a MANOVA on 
structural similarity (jaccard similarity of sorted co-occurrence vectors to the “true” 
category co-occurrence vectors) and type of explanation was run with learning context as 
a between-subjects factor. The multivariate effect of learning context was significant—
! 
F(2,69) = 8.169 , 
! 
p < .000, 
! 





p < .000, 
! 




= 8.4183 , 
! 
p = .005, 
! 
ˆ " 2 = .107 . In all, dyadic learners, more than individual learners, 
sorted in accordance with the normative (experimenter-designed) category clusters. 
Referential communication generates conceptual homogeneity 
Within-Dyad and Between-Dyad Sorting Homogeneity 
Dyadic learners sorted the stimuli in ways that closely resembled the “true” 
category clusters and, to varying degrees, the sort clusters of other learners. Figure 6 
compares the pair-wise jaccard similarities between the co-occurrence vectors of dyadic 
learners paired with their partners (
! 
M = .454 , 
! 
SD = .395) vs. pair-wise jaccard 
similarities between the co-occurrence vectors of various pseudo-dyads, including: 
dyadic learners paired randomly (
! 
M = .274 , 
! 





M = .249 , 
! 
SD = .262), and individual learners paired with each other 
individual learner (
! 
M = .140 , 
! 
SD = .128). 
 
Figure 6. Compares the mean pair-wise similarity of the post-learning sort clusters 
produced by actual dyads vs. between-dyad pairings and pairs of individual learners. 
Error bars indicate confidence interval. 
 
The post-learning sort clusters of actual dyads were not significantly more similar 






p = .149. Nevertheless, the post-learning sort clusters of non-partners were significantly 
more similar to one another than the sort clusters of individual learners, 
! 
t(597.131) = 8.404 , 
! 
p < .000. One should note that, prior to learning, the sort clusters produced by dyadic 
learners (pair-wise jaccard similarity
! 
M = .192 , 
! 
SD = .211) were no more similar to one 
another than were the sort clusters produced by individual learners (pair-wise jaccard 
similarity
! 
M = .196 , 
! 
SD = .171), 
! 
t(673.077) = -.290 , 
! 
p = .772. 
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Within-Dyad Referential Homogeneity 
Dyadic learners also tended to reference the same features as their partners—i.e. 
they used similar referential conventions (conventions were represented as a vector of 
probabilities with which each dyadic learner mentioned the various features). While 
partners mentioned the various features with differing probabilities when explaining their 
pre-learning sort clusters (
! 
median r
(pre"A ,pre"B ) = .422) they referred to those features with 
highly correlated probabilities (
! 
median r
(initial"A ,initial"B ) = .994 ) during the initial block of 
learning trials. Partners continued to use highly compatible conventions into the final 
block of learning trials (
! 
median r( final"A , final"B ) = .995) though conventions did change 
slightly between the initial and final blocks of learning trials (
! 
median r
(initial, final ) = .847). 
In addition, partners established reference to creatures with greater efficiency over 
time. Partners uttered significantly fewer words per diagnostic feature during the final 
block of dyadic learning trials (
! 
M = 2.349 , 
! 
SD = .898) than during the initial block of 
dyadic learning trials (
! 




t(31) = 6.221, 
! 
p < .000. Finally, 
referential conventions accorded well with each partner’s attention to the various 
features. The probabilities with which dyads referred to the various features during the 
last block of dyadic learning trials correlated strongly with the probabilities with which 




( final ,attend"A ) = .922  and 
! 
median r( final ,attend"B ) = .965). Also during the attention 








Figure 7 A-C. Compare the simple-rule function prediction accuracy rates vs. family-
resemblance function prediction accuracy rates of dyadic learners vs. individual learners 
who completed 160 learning trials vs. individual learners who completed 320 learning 
trials. Error bars indicate confidence interval. 
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Referential communication enhances simple-rule learning more than complex-rule 
learning 
Function prediction accuracy 
On average across the first 160 learning trials, dyadic learners predicted the 
simple-rule related functions with more sharply increasing accuracy rates than they 
predicted the family-resemblance related functions, while participants in the two 
individual conditions predicted both functions with similar accuracy (Figure 7 A-C). This 
early prediction asymmetry for dyadic learners was corroborated by a repeated-measures 
ANOVA on the function prediction accuracy rate with learning context as a between-
subjects factor and type of rule and block (the five blocks that entailed learning trials 1-
160) as within-subjects factors. The three-way interaction of learning context, type of 
rule, and block was significant—
! 
F(4,216) = 3.855 , 
! 
p = .011, 
! 
ˆ " 2 = .067—as were the two-
way interactions of learning context and type of rule
! 
F(1,54 ) = 5.326 , 
! 
p = .025, 
! 
ˆ " 2 = .090—
and learning context and block—
! 
F(4,216) = 9.218 , 
! 
p < .000, 
! 
ˆ " 2 = .146 . All main effects 
were also significant, including: learning context (
! 
F(1,54 ) =14.254 , 
! 
p < .000, 
! 
ˆ " 2 = .209), 
type of rule (
! 
F(1,54 ) = 8.4169 , 
! 
p = .005, 
! 
ˆ " 2 = .135) and block (
! 
F(4,216) =12.258 , 
! 
p < .000, 
! 
ˆ " 2 = .185). The interaction of type of rule and block failed to reach significance—
! 
ˆ " 2 = .026 . 
Dyadic learners, more than individual learners, continued to predict the simple-
rule related functions with increasingly greater accuracy than they predicted the family-
resemblance related functions across the final 160 learning trials. A repeated-measures 
ANOVA on the function prediction accuracy rate with learning context as a between-
subjects factor and type of rule and block (the five blocks that entailed learning trials 161-
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320) as within-subjects factors yielded a significant three-way interaction of learning 
context, type of rule, and block was significant—
! 
F(4,152) = 2.274 , 
! 
p = .029, 
! 
ˆ " 2 = .056 . The 




= 4.917 , 
! 
p = .033, 
! 
ˆ " 2 = .115—learning context and block—
! 
F(4,152) = 7.811, 
! 
p < .000, 
! 
ˆ " 2 = .067—and type 
of rule and block—
! 
F(4,152) = 4.081, 
! 
p < .000, 
! 
ˆ " 2 = .097—were also significant, as were 




= 31.328 , 
! 
p < .000, 
! 
ˆ " 2 = .452), type of rule 
(
! 
F(1,38) = 21.326 , 
! 
p < .000, 
! 
ˆ " 2 = .359) and block (
! 
F(4,152) = 20.635 , 
! 
p < .000, 
! 
ˆ " 2 = .352). 
Nevertheless, individuals who continued for 320 trials also exhibited a prediction 
asymmetry. They predicted the simple-rule related functions with increasingly greater 
accuracy than they predicted the family-resemblance related functions. A repeated-
measures ANOVA on the function-prediction accuracy rate with type of rule and block 
(learning trials 161-320) as within-subjects factors yielded a significant interaction of 




= 4.014 , 
! 
p = .005, 
! 
ˆ " 2 = .149—as well as significant main 
effects of type of rule (
! 
F(1,23) = 9.697 , 
! 
p = .005, 
! 






p = .031, 
! 
ˆ " 2 = .108). 
Posttest function prediction accuracy and attention allocation 
During the post-learning Attention Allocation task, participants across learning 
contexts predicted the simple-rule related functions with greater accuracy than the family-
resemblance related functions (Figure 8). Again, attention allocation—as represented by 
the probability of uncovering a simple-rule related vs. family-resemblance related 
feature—correlated with prediction accuracy—
! 
r(acc.,attend ) = .519, 
! 




Figure 8. Compares the simple-rule function prediction accuracy rates vs. simple-rule 
function prediction accuracy rates of dyadic learners vs. individual learners (both 
individuals who completed 160 learning trials and individuals who completed 320 
learning trials) during the Attention Allocation task. Error bars indicate confidence 
interval. 
 
A MANOVA on the function prediction accuracy rate and attention allocation (the 
probability of uncovering a feature) with learning context as a between-subjects factor 
and type of rule as a within-subjects factor yielded a significant multivariate effect for 
learning context—
! 
F(2,69) = 26.353, 
! 
p < .000, 
! 
ˆ " 2 = .247—and for type of rule—
! 
F(2,69) =14.879 , 
! 
p < .000, 
! 
ˆ " 2 = .164 , but not for the interaction of learning context and 
type of rule—
! 
ˆ " 2 = .012 . On average during the Attention Allocation task, dyadic learners 
predicted both functions with greater accuracy than individual learners (
! 
M
(dyad ) = .821, 
! 
SD = .160 , vs. 
! 
M(indiv.) = .596, 
! 
SD = .181), while uncovering features with greater 
likelihood than individual learners (
! 
M(dyad ) = .825, 
! 
SD = .253, vs. 
! 
M(indiv.) = .633, 
! 
SD = .345). Nevertheless, those differences between dyadic learners and individual 
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learners did not depend on which rule—simple or family resemblance—predicted the 
functions—
! 
M(dyad"sr) = .896 (
! 
SD = .122) vs. 
! 
M
(dyad" fr ) = .748  (
! 
SD = .162) and 
! 
M(indiv"sr) = .646 (
! 
SD = .201) vs. 
! 
M(indiv" fr ) = .546 (
! 
SD = .143). 
 
Figure 9. Compares the probability that a dyadic learner vs. individual learner (both 
individuals who completed 160 learning trials and individuals who completed 320 
learning trials) would uncover a family-resemblance related versus simple-rule related 
feature on any Attention Allocation task trial. Error bars indicate confidence interval. 
 
Univariate effects followed the same pattern. Learning context had a significant 
main effect on the function prediction accuracy rate —
! 
F(1,70) = 52.019 , 
! 
p < .000, 
! 






p < .000, 
! 
ˆ " 2 = .158 . Type of 




= 30.117 , 
! 
p < .000, 
! 




= 8.722 , 
! 
p = .004 , 
! 
ˆ " 2 = .111. The interaction of learning context and type of rule failed to reach 
significance, with 
! 
ˆ " 2 = .016  for the effect on the function prediction accuracy rate and 
! 




Figure 10. Compares the structural similarity of the post-learning sort clusters produced 
by dyadic learners vs. individual learners (both individuals who completed 160 learning 
trials and individuals who completed 320 learning trials) to the category clusters defined 
by one or another type of rule. Error bars indicate confidence interval. 
Structural similarity of post-learning sort clusters to the rule-defined clusters 
Similarly, participants across learning contexts sorted creatures into clusters that 
resembled simple-rule defined clusters more than family-resemblance defined clusters, 
though the sorts produced by dyadic learners were slightly more similar to the clusters 
defined by each type of rule (Figure 10). An ANOVA on structural similarity (jaccard 
similarity of sorted co-occurrence vectors to the simple-rule defined and the family-
resemblance defined co-occurrence vectors) with learning context as a between-subjects 
factor and type of rule as a within-subjects factor yielded a significant main effect for 




= 22.890 , 
! 
p < .000, 
! 
ˆ " 2 = .246 . Learning context was marginally 
significant—
! 
F(1,70) = 3.353, 
! 
p = .071, 
! 
ˆ " 2 = .046—and the interaction of learning context 
and type of rule failed to reach significance—
! 
ˆ " 2 < .000 . Further, dyadic and individual 
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learners cited simple-rule related features and family-resemblance related features with 
comparable likelihood when explaining their post-learning sorts (Figure 11). In all, 
participants across learning contexts sorted more in accordance with the simple-rule 
defined structure than the family-resemblance defined structure. Nevertheless, 
participants across learning context did not mention simple-rule related features with 
greater likelihood than family-resemblance related features. 
 
Figure 11. Compares the probability that dyadic learners vs. individual learners (both 
individuals who completed 160 learning trials and individuals who completed 320 
learning trials) mentioned features relating to one or another type of rule when explaining 
their post-learning sorts. Error bars indicate confidence interval.
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V. DISCUSSION 
With the present study, I investigated the interaction of referential communication 
and the structure of perceptual features on the joint processes of inventing a referential 
lexicon for novel objects and discovering the functional significance of those objects 
during an indirect category learning activity. As hypothesized, referential communication 
led to better learning of functional categories (H1), though earlier and more so for 
functions predicted by simple rather than complex rules (H2). These effects of 
communication reveal previously untested differences between “public’ and “private” 
category learning. Moreover, referential communication reduced conceptual variability 
within and between collaborating dyads (H3), while individuals who performed the same 
learning tasks remained conceptually heterogeneous. This effect of communication 
replicates and reinforces previous research (e.g., Markman & Makin, 1998). 
To explain the learning advantages observed among dyadic learners, I argue that 
referential communication may direct attention to relationships between features 
(perceptual and functional) and actions as well as render such relationships more 
memorable. Moreover, communication may foster and/or sustain greater motivation 
among collaborators and may allow them to take advantage of the differing expectations 
and heuristics each collaborator brings to the task. 
To explain the simplicity advantages observed among dyadic learners, I argue that 
referential communication may provide explicit “rules” for otherwise implicit (and 
perhaps more difficult) judgements. Dyads appear to have established reference to simple 
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rules earlier than they established reference to complex rules; thus, they could explicitly 
(and perhaps more easily) learn the simple rule earlier than the complex rule. 
Finally, to explain the conceptual homogeneity between and within dyads, I 
consider whether communication pushes “public” conceptualizations and publicly-
formed “private” conceptualizations towards a limited range of widely shareable 
conceptual structures. 
In what follows, I summarize the results that support each of these hypotheses and 
elaborate the preceding explanations of the results. Further, I speculate what these results 
might imply for research on category learning, communication, and joint activity. Finally, 
I suggest ways in which future research might further explore the relationship between 
“public” and “private” concepts. 
Referential communication enhances indirect category learning  
Summary of Results 
The results demonstrate that dyadic learners learned the functionally defined 
categories more quickly and more accurately than individual learners. Dyadic learners 
predicted functions with increasing accuracy across the Function Prediction (learning) 
trials. Only those individual learners who continued beyond 160 learning trials exhibited 
category prediction accuracy rates above thirty percent (where chance = 25%) as they 
approached the end of the learning task. Moreover, dyadic learners, more than individual 
learners, sorted stimuli into clusters that resembled the normative or “true” functional 
category clusters and relied more heavily than individual learners on functionally-defined 
or behaviorally-defined (i.e., what combination of “beams” were required in response to 
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the clustered stimuli) categories in explaining their sort clusters. Finally, dyadic learners 
attended to (i.e., uncovered) a greater number of diagnostic features than individual 
learners during the Attention Allocation posttest trials. In fact, dyadic learners uncovered 
at least as many features (a minimum of three) as required to determine the functional 
categories of creatures, while individuals fell short of the minimum. 
Explanation of the dyadic advantage 
Referential communication directs the joint attention and the joint actions of 
communicating dyads (e.g., Kronmüller & Barr, 2007; Clark & Lucy, 1975). For 
example, one dyad (D10.1) used “juicy-eyed” to reference the relationship between type 
of eyes and the nutritive “jelly” that the beamer should “juice” or extract from the 
creatures. By drawing attention to relationships between perceptual and functional 
features (eyes => jelly) and between features and actions (eyes => jelly => capture), 
referring expressions may cue the concept defined by these relationships (c.f., Lupyan et 
al., 2007); in this case, a nutritive creature that the beamer must capture. Moreover, by 
encapsulating the relationships that define the concept, referring expressions may render 
such relationships more memorable (ibid.).  
In addition to cuing a concept and the relationships that define the concept, 
referring expressions may serve as a compressed form of the concepts and its features—
i.e., a conceptual manipulative (A. Clark & Karmiloff-Smith, 1993). The referring 
expression “juicy-eyed” compresses the relationship between eye type, nutritive value, 
and the extraction of that value. By using the referring expression “juicy-eyed,” the 
members of D10.1 could easily infer the appropriate action, while avoiding burdensome 
comparisons of the different eye types and the functions and actions each type implied. 
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While the referring expression “juicy-eyed” is especially evocative, 
communicating dyads might reap similar benefits from more mundane but often repeated 
referring expressions. Interlocutors tend to reuse each other’s referring expressions (e.g., 
Garrod & Anderson, 1987). Moreover, a recently used referring expression is frequently 
reused, and a frequently used referring expression is mutually available and mutually 
expected for further reuse (Brennan & Clark, 1996). As observed in the present study, 
these repeated referring expressions serve as ad hoc, yet stable, conventions of reference, 
with each partner of a communicating dyad referring to the same features. Such ad hoc 
conventions reduce cognitive load (Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986); the use of conventional 
references is more likely to convey mutually salient, mutually expected, and mutually 
understood conceptual content (c.f., Jolicoeur et al., 1984). 
Taken together, these various cognitive benefits deriving from referential 
communication and referential convention might explain why those engaged in a 
“public” categorization activity learn novel categories better than those engaged in a 
“private” categorization activity. 
That said, other aspects of social and collaborative activity might also explain the 
dyadic advantage observed in the present study. The learning advantages among dyadic 
learners may result from increased motivation. This goes beyond mere social facilitation, 
otherwise the prize offered to the best performing participant, audience effects (via the 
experimenter), and co-action effects (performing the task at the same time as other 
participants) should have helped individual learners, as well (c.f., Zajonc, 1965). Instead, 
motivation may derive from the interdependence of dyadic learners (c.f., Deutsch, 1949; 
Johnson & Johnson, 1989). That is, the “spotter’s” score depended on the “beamer” 
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making an accurate prediction, which, in turn, depended on establishing joint reference to 
creatures. Hence, dyadic learners were motivated to jettison idiosyncratic conceptions, 
expend greater effort on the task, and avoid satisficing solutions. 
The dyadic advantage observed in the present study may also result from 
knowledge diversity or, more accurately the differing expectations and heuristics that 
derive from differing knowledge. Dyadic learners may approach the Function Prediction 
task with differing expectations and use different heuristics to yield differing and perhaps 
more numerous hypotheses about the relationships between perceptual and functional 
features and between those features and their actions. Competing hypotheses may yield 
better hypotheses about novel objects in a novel activity (c.f., Wiley & Jolly, 2003). 
Diversity among partners may also encourage partners to proffer simpler and more 
shareable hypotheses. Interlocutors try to minimize the joint effort of sharing beliefs 
(Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986) and tend to take each other’s knowledge into account 
when trying to establish joint reference (Fussell & Krauss, 1989). 
Similarly, human beings may differ in their previously developed inductive 
reasoning skills. Such skills might provide a participant an early advantage in learning to 
predict functional categories. While participants were randomly assigned to learning 
conditions, one cannot entirely ignore the possibility that a greater number of highly 
skilled participants were assigned to the dyadic condition. In the present study, partners 




(acc."A ,acc."B ) = .744 ). This similarity in prediction accuracy would 
suggest that either all partners were comparably skilled at induction or that the more 
skilled partners were also adept at circumventing the referential strictures of the task (i.e., 
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no explicit guidance on predictions) to convey predictive information to their less skilled 
partners. In either case, a pretest of inductive reasoning may help future studies prevent 
the remote possibility of assigning a greater number of highly skilled participants to the 
dyadic condition. 
Then again, these alternative explanations do not diminish the influence of 
referential communication. Only through communication could dyadic learners take 
advantage of interdependence and/or diversity of knowledge and/or skills. Without 
communication motivation may dwindle and diversity may hinder rather than help the 
learning process. 
Differences in the tasks performed by dyadic and individual learners may also 
lead to a learning advantage in the dyadic condition. Individual learners perform both the 
role of the beamer and the role of the spotter on each learning trial; dyadic learners 
alternate these roles with each trial. On the one hand, one might argue that separating the 
roles reduces cognitive load for dyadic learners: the spotter handles the perceptual 
discrimination task, while the beamer handles the prediction task. One the other hand, 
one might also argue that each separate role in the dyadic learning condition requires 
cognitive effort comparable to that of the joint role in the individual learning condition. 
In addition to the perceptual discrimination task, the spotter must produce a referring 
expression that conveys the predictive perceptual information to the beamer. The beamer 
must comprehend the referring expression and interpret how the verbally conveyed 
perceptual information relates to the prediction task. I offer a possible resolution to these 
arguments in the final suggestion for further exploration of the dyadic advantage. 
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Implications of the dyadic advantage 
Human beings can form categories when working in isolation. Most previous 
research on “private” categorization, though, has focused on simple structures that define 
a small number of categories of a small number of exemplars. In the present study, I 
increased the complexity of the category structure and the number of categories and 
exemplars only slightly beyond the typical levels. Yet individual learners had a difficult 
time learning functions and combining them into categories, while dyadic learners 
accomplished this task with greater efficiency. This dyadic advantage might imply that, 
under time and task strictures that resemble the present study, the “public” act of 
referential communication plays a necessary role in the efficient formation of more 
complex “private” categories. Referential communication both distributes and 
consolidates the cognition of interlocutors. 
In terms of psycholinguistic research, the present study offers extra-linguistic 
evidence that the “private” concepts interlocutors take away from the “public” act of 
referential communication differ from those formed in private. For example, dyadic 
learners sorted creatures into clusters that better matched the “true” category clusters and 
allocated attention widely enough to predict functional categories. In the absence of 
conversation, category learning appeared slow and laborious for individual learners. 
Further, the present study offers converging evidence on the benefits of collaborative 
problem solving and decision-making. An advantage in categorizing a novel problem 
might explain the oft-observed collaborative advantages in making decisions and solving 
problems (see, Johnson & Johnson, 2005, for review). 
  64 
 
Further exploration of the dyadic advantage 
In terms of understanding the learning advantages observed among dyadic 
learners, the present study was limited in three ways. Whereas theorists (e.g, Chui et al., 
1998; Steels & Belpaeme, 2005) have claimed that communication might impose 
structure on an ill-defined activity and the objects, actions, and events it entails, the 
present study restricted category formation to one category structure with one normative 
classification scheme. Asking whether the dyadic advantage would persist where no 
normative structure exists seems an obvious follow-up question. To address this question, 
one might redesign the learning activity so that perceptual and latent features relate to 
each other and with the actions of collaborators in any of many possible ways. Then, if 
dyadic learners exhibit a greater tendency to form categories than individual learners one 
can attribute that difference to referential communication with greater confidence. 
Also, by providing feedback on each of the functions entailed in a prediction 
rather than feedback on the category prediction as a whole, the present study does not 
clearly answer whether dyadic learners better learned categories or better learned each of 
the component functions. One can address this question with a simple modification to the 
present study: a dyadic condition without function-related feedback. 
Finally, the present study did not control for any benefits from linguistic 
encoding, per se. Again, a simple modification to the present study—an individual 
condition where participants engage in private speech—could address what benefits 
might derive from thinking aloud. Moreover, if participants later based predictions on 
recordings of that private speech, one could also address whether or not performing only 
the beamer role requires fewer cognitive resources than performing both the spotter role 
and the beamer role. 
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Referential communication enhances simple-rule learning more than complex-rule 
learning  
Summary of Results 
The results also demonstrate that the dyadic learning advantage was greater for 
the simple-rule predicted function than for the family-resemblance predicted function. 
Throughout the Function Prediction (learning) task, dyads predicted the simple-rule 
function with greater accuracy than the family-resemblance function. That said, the 
results of the posttests demonstrate that all participants came to exhibit this asymmetry 
between simple-rule learning and family-resemblance learning. They sorted more in 
accordance with the simple-rule structure. They predicted the simple-rule function with 
greater accuracy than the family-resemblance function, and they attended to the simple-
rule related feature with greater likelihood than the family-resemblance related features 
when making those predictions. 
Explanation of the simplicity advantage 
Reference provides an explicit “rule” for an otherwise implicit judgement of how 
perceptual and functional features relate to one another and to the actions of interlocutors. 
Again as an example, the members of dyad D10.1 used “juicy-eyed” to reference the 
relationship between type of eyes and the nutritive “jelly” that the beamer should “juice” 
or extract from the creatures. Simple relationships ease the process of establishing joint 
reference. Dyads appear to have established reference to the simple-rules earlier in the 
learning process, from which point they could explicitly monitor when the referenced 
rule did or did not apply.  
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That said, the simplicity advantage observed in dyadic function learning mirrors 
the well-documented simplicity principle in “private” category learning—i.e., human 
beings tend to learn simple relationships between features and their significance more 
easily than complex relationships (Feldman, 2003b). After all, during the posttests, 
individual learners (whether learning for 160 or 320 trials) also exhibited better learning 
of the simple rule than the family-resemblance rule. Thus, one could argue that referential 
communication simply increases the efficiency of learning: i.e., explicit learning is 
simply more efficient than implicit learning. 
Then again, dyadic learners learned the family resemblance rule better than 
individual learners learned the simple rule. Dyadic learners predicted the family 
resemblance function more accurately than individual learners predicted the simple rule 
function during the posttest. Dyadic-learner accuracy when predicting the family 
resemblance function (
! 
M = .748 , 
! 
SD = .162) differed significantly from the individual-
learner accuracy when predicting the simple rule function (
! 
M = .646 , 
! 






p = .023). Moreover, dyadic learners relied on family-resemblance about as 
much as individual learners relied on the simple-rule when sorting and when attending to 
features. The jaccard similarity between the co-occurrence vectors of dyadic learners and 
the family-resemblance defined co-occurrences (
! 
M = .281, 
! 
SD = .217) did not differ 
significantly from the jaccard similarity between the co-occurrence vectors of individual 
learners and the simple-rule defined co-occurrences (
! 
M = .241, 
! 






p = .364 ). Also, the probability of a dyadic learner uncovering a family-
resemblance feature (
! 
M = .705 , 
! 
SD = .391) did not differ significantly from the 
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probability of an individual learner uncovering a simple rule feature (
! 
M = .757 , 
! 




p = .499. 
In other words, referential communication appears to compress or simplify the 
family-resemblance structure, as well. For example, the aforementioned dyad (D10.1) 
referred to the prototypical destructive creature as “hungry, and carrying a knife and 
fork.” Such a reference abstracts away the details of surface features (e.g., moving torso 
design, uneven tentacle length, and sharp-ended fins), rendering a simple yet concrete 
representation of a creature ready to attack. Variations on this economical representation 
likewise reduced the effort of judging creatures that differed from the prototype. 
Implications of the simplicity advantage 
Considered alone, the efficiency of learning simple rules might imply that 
structural complexity (or simplicity) constrains “public” and “private” category learning 
in similar ways. This finding clearly extends psycholinguistic research, where studies 
rarely control for structural complexity. Also, this finding reinforces existing research on 
category learning, offering further support for dual-system (explicit and implicit systems) 
theories of categorization. The apparent efficiency of establishing reference to a simple 
rule (i.e., explicitly stating that rule) yields efficiency in learning that simple rule. 
Nevertheless, the perceived (and, perhaps, practical) complexity of a concept 
depends in part on the shareability of the convention used in referring to the relationships 
between perceptual and functional features and between features and actions. For 
example, the use of basic-level category labels compresses the maximal number of 
concept-differentiating features into single word references such as dog or hammer. 
Certain conversations may generate equally shareable (in this case, compressed) 
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references to either complex or simple relationships; other conversations may generate 
references that complicate the simple relationships to which they refer. In either case, one 
cannot pre-state dyadic learning outcomes based on the category structure or its 
complexity alone. 
The same might hold true for collaborative problem solving and decision-making, 
where researchers often compare outcomes from well-structured (simple) and ill-
structured (complex) problems (c.f., Kapur & Kinzer, 2007). Like the dyads in the present 
study, problem-solving groups have been found to converge on ad hoc conventions early 
in conversation (Kapur, Voiklis, & Kinzer, 2008; Voiklis, Kapur, Kinzer, & Black, 
2006). The shareability of such conventions may predict the performance of problem-
solving and decision-making groups. 
Further exploration of the simplicity advantage 
In terms of understanding the simplicity advantage, the present study was limited 
in two ways. First, each rule—both simple and complex—predicted different and 
orthogonal functions. While this design may isolate the effects of structural complexity, 
one might ask whether simplicity clearly dominates when rules of differing complexity 
predict the same function and the same course of action? One way to answer this question 
is to simply have both rules predict the same function; if most participants settle for the 
most frugal solution—the simple rule—then one might argue that simplicity constrains 
both “public” and “private” category learning, with greater confidence. Better yet, one 
might again design an activity where perceptual and latent features relate to each other 
and with the actions of collaborators in any of many possible ways. One could then 
compare what structures emerge from individual and collaborative learning contexts. 
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Then, if dyads extract mainly simple rules from such an ill-defined informational 
environment one might attribute this bias to some general simplicity advantage. 
The second limitation stems from allowing dyads to invent their own referential 
lexicons. One might respond to the present study by asking whether and to what extent 
the shareability (in terms of compression) of referential conventions enhanced or 
hindered the learning of either the simple or complex rules. One might address this 
question by redesigning the present study so that a confederate of the experimenter refers 
to creatures using different, more or less shareable, conventions. 
Referential communication generates conceptual homogeneity 
Summary of Results 
Finally, the results also demonstrate that dyadic learners exhibited greater 
conceptual homogeneity than individual learners. Dyadic partners tended to reference to 
the same observable features throughout the learning task. Later, each partner attended to 
those same features when making predictions on his or her own. Moreover, dyadic 
learners sorted creatures into clusters that resembled those of other dyadic learners, both 
within and between dyads. Post-learning sort clusters were significantly more similar 
between dyads than between individual learners. 
Explanation of conceptual homogeneity 
Referential communication imposes shareability constraints: interlocutors try to 
minimize the joint cognitive effort of jointly construing an activity’s various referents and 
their significance (Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986). Dyads appear to assure at least a 
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minimal level of shareability by quickly establishing ad hoc conventions of reference. 
Adherence to these conventions may reinforce attention to the features towards which 
conventional references point. These “public” attentional patterns may later direct 
“private” attention towards the same features. Moreover, similarities in referring to 
similar creatures may delineate a particular structure relating those creatures. Again, 
adherence to partner-specific conventions of reference may reinforce that structure. 
Conceptual homogeneity between dyads may signal a conceptual attractor in 
communication. That is, communication may push “public” conceptualizations and 
publicly-formed “private” conceptualizations towards a limited range of widely shareable 
conceptual structures. 
That said, participants in the present study learned (albeit indirectly) a normative 
category structure. Dyadic learners learned this normative structure much better than 
individual learners. Between-dyad conceptual homogeneity may represent little more 
than normative learning of an experimenter-designed classification scheme. 
Then again, dyadic learners exhibited base-level conceptual homogeneity—
establishing and adhering to ad hoc conventions of reference—during the first block of 
learning trials, far earlier than they exhibited normative learning. To a certain extent, this 
base-level conceptual homogeneity may enhance normative learning. Specifically, ad hoc 
conventions of reference may stabilize perceptual features just enough so that dyadic 
learners can test hypotheses of how those perceptual features relate to functional features 
and how features relate to actions. This does not mean that conceptual homogeneity 
always leads to better learning; in fact, complete and uncritical homogeneity—
groupthink—often yields cognitive myopia, leaving many hypotheses unexplored and 
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untested.  (c.f., Janis, 1982). Instead, dyadic learning may require what Voiklis et al. 
(2006) described as “tensile” intersubjectivity, where collaborators agree on the goal and 
parameters of the activity to which they can apply their differing skills and heuristics.  
Implications of conceptual homogeneity 
Group think—a dysfunctional form of conceptual homogeneity—has been widely 
observed in studies on collaborative work groups (e.g., Janis, 1982). Psycholinguists have 
often observed the emergence of conceptual homogeneity—similar lexicon and similar 
syntax—among interlocutors and groups of interlocutors (see Branigan, Pickering, & 
Cleland, 2000, and Pickering & Branigan, 1999, on syntactic coordination; see Clark, 
1996, for review of lexical coordination). Research on reference and category learning 
has provided extra-linguistic evidence (similarity in sorting and similarity in typicality 
judgements) of within and between dyad conceptual homogeneity (Markman & Makin, 
1998; Malt & Sloman, 2004). The present study accords with these findings, but does not 
clearly extend them. The dyadic advantage in learning a normative structure makes it 
unclear whether and to what extent between-dyad conceptual homogeneity derives from 
some kind of conceptual attractor—a limited range of widely shareable conceptual 
structures—in communication. 
Further exploration of conceptual homogeneity 
As with the observed dyadic advantage and the observed simplicity advantage, the 
single normative category structure that underlay learning in the present study may limit 
generalizations concerning conceptual homogeneity and any in limits in the range of 
widely shareable conceptual structures in communication. Again, as an extension of the 
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present study, one would need to design an activity where perceptual and latent features 
relate to each other and with the actions of collaborators in any of many possible ways. 
Then, if pairs of interlocutors converge on similar referential conventions and/or similar 
ways of categorizing stimuli one can, with greater confidence, attribute that conceptual 
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Descriptive and Point-Based Feedback 
Table A1. Descriptive Feedback for the Function Prediction and Attention Allocation 
Tasks. 









Time and energy 




damaged, and no 
jelly extracted 
Nutritive Only Tractor beam wasted  Jelly extracted  
Life support 
damaged, and 
tractor beam wasted  
Life support 
damaged, some jelly 
extracted 
Destructive 
Only Stun beam wasted  
No jelly extracted, 








Tractor beam and 
stun beam both 
wasted  
Stun beam wasted, 
some jelly extracted  
Life support 
protected, but 
tractor beam wasted  
Life support 
protected, and jelly 
extracted 
No Response Too slow, are you alert?  
Too slow, no jelly 
extracted  
Too slow, life 
support damaged  
Too slow, life 
support damaged 




Table A2. Energy Meter: Rewards and Penalties for the Function Prediction and 
Attention Allocation Tasks. 










Significance 10 -5 -10 -15 
Nutritive Only -5 10 -15 -10 
Destructive Only -5 -10 10 -5 
Nutritive & 
Destructive -10 5 -5 10 





Examples of Stimuli 
 
Figure B1. Examples of the binary feature values that instantiate the stimuli and the 





Instructions for Tasks and Task Interfaces 
 
 
Figure C1. Describes the scenario for the game tasks and provides instruction on how to 







Figure C2 A & B. Spotter’s Function Prediction Task Interface. A (top) = Single Player, 







Figure C3 A & B. Function Prediction Task Instructions. A (top) = Single Player, and B 
























Figure C8. Instructions for Attention Allocation Task, including how to execute task-
related action. 
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